Bayesianism and wishful thinking are compatible.

Bayesian principles show up across many domains of human cognition, but wishful thinking-where beliefs are updated in the direction of desired outcomes rather than what the evidence implies-seems to threaten the universality of Bayesian approaches to the mind. In this Article, we show that Bayesian optimality and wishful thinking are, despite first appearances, compatible. The setting of opposing goals can cause two groups of people with identical prior beliefs to reach opposite conclusions about the same evidence through fully Bayesian calculations. We show that this is possible because, when people set goals, they receive privileged information in the form of affective experiences, and this information systematically supports goal-consistent conclusions. We ground this idea in a formal, Bayesian model in which affective prediction errors drive wishful thinking. We obtain empirical support for our model across five studies.

Testing the automaticity features of the affect misattribution procedure: The roles of awareness and intentionality.

The affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is a measure of implicit evaluations, designed to index the automatic retrieval of evaluative knowledge. The AMP effect consists in participants evaluating neutral target stimuli positively when preceded by positive primes and negatively when preceded by negative primes. After multiple prior tests of intentionality, Hughes et al. (Behav Res Methods 55(4):1558-1586, 2023) examined the role of awareness in the AMP and found that AMP effects were larger when participants indicated that their response was influenced by the prime than when they did not. Here we report seven experiments (six preregistered; N = 2350) in which we vary the methodological features of the AMP to better understand this awareness effect. In Experiments 1-4, we establish variability in the magnitude of the awareness effect in response to variations in the AMP procedure. By introducing further modifications to the AMP procedure, Experiments 5-7 suggest an alternative explanation of the awareness effect, namely that awareness can be the outcome, rather than the cause, of evaluative congruency between primes and responses: Awareness effects emerged even when awareness could not have contributed to AMP effects, including when participants judged influence awareness for third parties or primes were presented post hoc. Finally, increasing the evaluative strength of the primes increased participants' tendency to misattribute AMP effects to the influence of target stimuli. Together, the present findings suggest that AMP effects can create awareness effects rather than vice versa and support the AMP's construct validity as a measure of unintentional evaluations of which participants are also potentially unaware.

Hoist by its own petard: The ironic and fatal flaws of dual-process theory.

By stipulating the existence of a system 1 and a system 2, dual-process theories raise questions about how these systems function. De Neys identifies several such questions for which no plausible answers have ever been offered. What makes the nature of systems 1 and 2 so difficult to ascertain? The answer is simple: The systems do not exist.

A computational theory of the subjective experience of flow.

Flow is a subjective state characterized by immersion and engagement in one's current activity. The benefits of flow for productivity and health are well-documented, but a rigorous description of the flow-generating process remains elusive. Here we develop and empirically test a theory of flow's computational substrates: the informational theory of flow. Our theory draws on the concept of mutual information, a fundamental quantity in information theory that quantifies the strength of association between two variables. We propose that the mutual information between desired end states and means of attaining them - [Formula: see text] - gives rise to flow. We support our theory across five experiments (four preregistered) by showing, across multiple activities, that increasing [Formula: see text] increases flow and has important downstream benefits, including enhanced attention and enjoyment. We rule out alternative constructs including alternative metrics of associative strength, psychological constructs previously shown to predict flow, and various forms of instrumental value.

The automatic influence of advocacy on lawyers and novices.

It has long been known that advocating for a cause can alter the advocate's beliefs. Yet a guiding assumption of many advocates is that the biasing effect of advocacy is controllable. Lawyers, for instance, are taught that they can retain unbiased beliefs while advocating for their clients and that they must do so to secure just outcomes. Across ten experiments (six preregistered; N = 3,104) we show that the biasing effect of advocacy is not controllable but automatic. Merely incentivizing people to advocate altered a range of beliefs about character, guilt and punishment. This bias appeared even in beliefs that are highly stable, when people were financially incentivized to form true beliefs and among professional lawyers, who are trained to prevent advocacy from biasing their judgements.

Problems with the dual-systems approach to temporal cognition.

Contrary to Hoerl & McCormack (H&M), we argue that the best account of temporal cognition in humans is one in which a single system becomes capable of representing time. We suggest that H&M's own evidence for dual systems of temporal cognition - simultaneous contradictory beliefs - does not recommend dual systems, and that the single system approach is more plausible.

Gender Disparities in Awards to Neuroscience Researchers.

Women in academia receive fewer prestigious awards than their male counterparts. This gender gap may emerge purely from structural factors (e.g., gender differences in time spent in academia, institutional prestige, and academic performance), or from a combination of structural and psychological factors (e.g., gender schemas). To test these competing predictions, we assessed the independent contribution of year of degree, institutional prestige (a composite of prestige of PhD school and current affiliation), academic performance (total publications, total cites, and h-index), and gender to the prestige of awards earned by male (N = 298) and female (N = 134) academic neuroscientists. Award prestige was determined by an independent set of neuroscientists. Men earned more prestigious awards than women after controlling for institutional prestige, year of degree, and total publications. But after controlling for total citations or h-index, no gender difference appeared. Mediation analyses revealed that the gender disparity in awards was mediated by a gender difference in total cites and h-index. There was a reciprocal effect as well, in that the gender disparity in total cites and h-index was partially mediated by awards. These results point to an indirect path by which psychological factors may create gender disparities in academic awards: gender schemas may lead to women's papers receiving fewer citations than men's papers, resulting in more prestigious awards for men than for women. Additionally, our results suggest that gender disparities in awards and citations may reinforce each other. Practical implications for promoting gender equality in academic awards are discussed.

The Mythical Number Two.

It is often said that there are two types of psychological processes: one that is intentional, controllable, conscious, and inefficient, and another that is unintentional, uncontrollable, unconscious, and efficient. Yet, there have been persistent and increasing objections to this widely influential dual-process typology. Critics point out that the 'two types' framework lacks empirical support, contradicts well-established findings, and is internally incoherent. Moreover, the untested and untenable assumption that psychological phenomena can be partitioned into two types, we argue, has the consequence of systematically thwarting scientific progress. It is time that we as a field come to terms with these issues. In short, the dual-process typology is a convenient and seductive myth, and we think cognitive science can do better.

Preferences for moral vs. immoral traits in others are conditional.

The preference for morality in others is regarded as a dominant factor in person perception. Moral traits are thought to foster liking, and immoral traits are thought to foster disliking, irrespective of the context in which they are embedded. We report the results of four studies that oppose this view. Using both explicit and implicit measures, we found that the preference for morality vs. immorality in others is conditional on the evaluator's current goals. Specifically, when immorality was conducive to participants' current goals, the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others was eliminated or reversed. The preferences for mercifulness vs. mercilessness (experiment 1), honesty vs. dishonesty (experiment 2), sexual fidelity vs. infidelity (experiment 3), and altruism vs. selfishness (experiment 4) were all found to be conditional. These findings oppose the consensus view that people have a dominant preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others. Our findings also speak to nativist and empiricist theories of social preferences and the stability of the "social contract" underlying productive human societies.

Somatostatin signaling in neuronal cilia is critical for object recognition memory.

Most neurons possess a single, nonmotile cilium that projects out from the cell surface. These microtubule-based organelles are important in brain development and neurogenesis; however, their function in mature neurons is unknown. Cilia express a complement of proteins distinct from other neuronal compartments, one of which is the somatostatin receptor subtype SST(3). We show here that SST(3) is critical for object recognition memory in mice. sst3 knock-out mice are severely impaired in discriminating novel objects, whereas they retain normal memory for object location. Further, systemic injection of an SST(3) antagonist (ACQ090) disrupts recall of familiar objects in wild-type mice. To examine mechanisms of SST(3), we tested synaptic plasticity in CA1 hippocampus. Electrically evoked long-term potentiation (LTP) was normal in sst3 knock-out mice, while adenylyl cyclase/cAMP-mediated LTP was impaired. The SST(3) antagonist also disrupted cAMP-mediated LTP. Basal cAMP levels in hippocampal lysate were reduced in sst3 knock-out mice compared with wild-type mice, while the forskolin-induced increase in cAMP levels was normal. The SST(3) antagonist inhibited forskolin-stimulated cAMP increases, whereas the SST(3) agonist L-796,778 increased basal cAMP levels in hippocampal slices but not hippocampal lysate. Our results show that somatostatin signaling in neuronal cilia is critical for recognition memory and suggest that the cAMP pathway is a conserved signaling motif in cilia. Neuronal cilia therefore represent a novel nonsynaptic compartment crucial for signaling involved in a specific form of synaptic plasticity and in novelty detection.